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Over the last few years, there has been a growing effort to 
describe the institutional setting of local budgetary decisions. 
The Fiscal Policy Space (FPS) framework describes five cat-
egories of constraints on local fiscal policy: the intergovern-
mental setting, the economic base, locally imposed fiscal 
controls, demand for services, and political culture (Pagano 
& Hoene, 2010). These factors “limit, shape or provide 
opportunities for policy choices” (p. 248) made by local gov-
ernment officials. This article integrates the FPS framework 
into Ostrom’s (2007) Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework. This approach is used in this analysis to 
examine strategic interactions among overlapping local 
jurisdictions in the context of local fiscal policy.
The type of strategic interaction that may exist between 
two governments is determined by their geographic and hier-
archical position relative to each other. Horizontal interac-
tions occur among neighboring1 jurisdictions, while vertical 
interactions occur among overlapping jurisdictions. These 
vertical interactions may span across the federal, state, and 
local tiers of federal government, or alternatively cross over-
lapping local jurisdictions. School districts, municipalities, 
counties, and the broad range of special purpose districts 
exist in a shared local environment.
This study examines how jurisdictional overlap influ-
ences property tax rates. Do these local entities mirror each 
other’s rate setting behavior or do they crowd each other out 
in competition for the same tax base? Do the strategic inter-
actions occur simultaneously or are they lagged over a mul-
tiyear period? Do different types of local governments 
respond systematically differently to the behavior of their 
overlapping neighbors? These questions have important fis-
cal implications for localities. If one type of local govern-
ment has a strategic advantage in the competition for use of 
the tax base, then it may crowd out the services provided by 
the less competitive entity. Alternatively, local governments 
may take signals from each other about when the time is ripe 
for increasing general services or issuing debt funded by 
property tax revenues. Understanding how these interactions 
influence tax administration is an important aspect of the 
FPS of local government.
The joining of the FPS and the IAD frameworks allows 
for an analysis of how the interactions among overlapping 
jurisdictions create patterns of fiscal behavior. The annual 
determination of policy is described as an action space that is 
influenced by environmental constraints. In addition, local 
government policy actions may create feedback loops that 
influence those environmental constraints. Berry (2008) 
identified the property tax base as a common-pool resource 
shared among local governments and the property owner. 
The IAD framework is designed to address these specific 
types of collective action problems.
This article explores the strategic interactions between 
counties and school districts by testing for reactions to how 
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This article explores the strategic interactions between overlapping counties and school districts within the context of 
property tax policy. Overlapping local governments share either part or all of their property tax bases and therefore may 
take into account each other’s tax policies when deciding their annual property tax rate. A dynamic model is developed to 
analyze how property tax rate determination is influenced by the fiscal policies of both overlapping and neighboring local 
jurisdictions. The results suggest a short-term mimicking effect that is largely canceled out the following period. These 
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the property tax is used in overlapping jurisdictions. The 
analysis uses a rich panel of the financial characteristics of 
the local governments in the state of Georgia. The data from 
Georgia are particularly useful because nearly every county 
in the state has a school district that shares the same boundar-
ies and gross property tax base. Using data on the rates, rev-
enues and bases of each jurisdiction’s property tax as well as 
information on the other revenues received by each govern-
ment, this study tests whether property tax levies for both 
types of governments are established in response to the over-
lapping jurisdiction’s use of the same base.
The following section provides background on the chal-
lenges created by overlapping local governments. The next 
section presents a theoretical model used to describe strate-
gic interactions. The context of the data collected from local 
governments in Georga is then described. This is followed by 
a presentation of the results of the analysis. The paper then 
ends with a discussion of the implication of the findings for 
future work on local government finance.
Overview of Local Fiscal Overlap
There is a growing literature investigating the implications of 
having multiple stacked local jurisdictions providing services 
and raising revenue within a shared space. Within the public 
finance literature, the primary concern is to determine how a 
given jurisdiction’s tax policies are established in response to 
the policies of their neighbors. A recent series of articles have 
investigated Local Option Sales Tax rates established by 
counties and their subsumed municipalities (Burge & Piper, 
2012; Burge & Rogers, 2011, 2016). In the first of these arti-
cles, Burge and Rogers (2011) estimate the cross-tier tax elas-
ticities between counties and municipalities. The authors find 
that increases in county local option sales taxes are associated 
with reductions in municipal property tax bases. Their result 
is evidence that county-level fiscal decisions have external 
effects on the cities within their boundaries. This effect cre-
ates an incentive for strategic decision making by both levels 
of government. In a similar vein, Burge and Piper (2012) find 
that both vertical and horizontal interactions influence coun-
ties and municipalities in deciding whether to adopt a local 
option sales tax. Most recently, Burge and Rogers (2016) 
investigate the paths of policy diffusion across overlapping 
jurisdictions. They develop an index to identify leaders and 
followers in fiscal policy adoption and ultimately are able to 
measure variation across jurisdictions in their sensitivity to 
the pressures of tax competition.
Given the importance of the property tax in funding local 
services, it is notable that relatively little research has been 
performed on the influence of overlapping jurisdictions on 
the use of this revenue source. Revelli’s (2001) study of 
property taxes in the United Kingdom is the only article 
identified that has examined this issue. His analysis exam-
ined the interaction between overlapping districts and county 
governments in nonmetropolitan regions of England. His 
analysis found no evidence of any influence from overlap-
ping jurisdictions in the determination of property tax rates.
The implications of overlapping jurisdictions have also 
been explored in the public budgeting and municipal finance 
literatures. Goodman (2015) revisits the issues of local gov-
ernment fragmentation’s impact on local spending that were 
initially raised by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). Goodman 
finds that the separation of service responsibilities across a 
greater number of special purpose districts increases the 
level of aggregate local spending.
Another area of research has focused on the impact of 
overlapping jurisdictions on the issuance of public debt. 
Martell (2007) conducts an empirical analysis of Hildreth and 
Miller’s (2002) conceptual model of how overlapping juris-
dictions may influence municipal borrowing costs. Martel’s 
analysis finds that more fragmented local governments are 
associated with a reduced debt burden. This surprising result 
suggests that greater fragmentation among local jurisdictions 
may reduce borrowing costs. Martel suggests that local gov-
ernments may closely observe the debt of their overlapping 
neighbors to avoid becoming subject to a credit downgrade. 
Greer (2015) builds on Martel’s study by confirming the ear-
lier findings on the relationship between fragmentation and 
borrowing costs. Greer also examines the impact of an 
increase on the stock of overlapping debt on a government’s 
borrowing cost. He finds that increases to the overlapping 
stock of debt issued by cities, school districts, and special pur-
pose entities increases the True Interest Costs (TIC) of county 
general obligation debt. This finding is consistent with rec-
ommendations in some much earlier accounting literature 
that overlapping debt should be included in the financial con-
dition assessments of local governments attempting to issue 
bonds (Petersen, 1977; Raman, 1981).
Another way to frame strategic interaction among overlap-
ping jurisdictions is as a set of institutional constraints. 
Pagano and Hoene’s (2010) FPS framework was developed 
as a tool for organizing the various attributes of local govern-
ment that influence fiscal policy. These are organized into 
five categories: the intergovernmental context, the economic 
base, locally imposed fiscal controls, service responsibilities, 
and the local political culture. Their application of the con-
cept of intergovernmental constraints focused on Tax and 
Expenditure Limitations (TELs) and intergovernmental ser-
vice mandates. This article will extend the FPS framework to 
also include the influence of both vertical and horizontal 
neighbors’ fiscal policies. The context of this analysis is to 
assess how a collection of overlapping jurisdictions influence 
each other’s use of a shared resource—the property tax base. 
This study will specifically determine the extent that the 
annual determination of the property tax millage rate is deter-
mined strategically with respect to overlapping jurisdictions.
The focus of this study on the institutions that influence 
the use of a common-pool resource lends itself to being mod-
eled using the IAD framework. The FPS framework offers a 
way to operationalize the environmental institutions and 
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constraints that are a key part of an IAD model. As shown in 
Figure 1, the elements of the FPS populate the three clusters 
of variables that affect the structure of the action arena. In the 
case of local fiscal policymaking, the action arena is the bud-
getary process and, specifically for this analysis, the determi-
nation of the property tax levy. The three clusters of 
environmental conditions are the physical and material con-
ditions of the locality, the attributes of the community that 
the policy is made within, and the rules governing behavior 
in the community.
There is an important benefit gained from integrating the 
concepts of FPS into the IAD framework. The IAD model 
explicitly recognizes the feedback that flows from action out-
comes back into the environmental constraints. This fits the 
endogenous nature of strategic tax interactions that the public 
economics literature has modeled for several years (Brueckner, 
2003). Recent efforts to apply the FPS framework have framed 
its institutional constraints as strictly exogenous factors that 
affect local policy (Hendrick & Crawford, 2014). While this 
may hold for some of the FPS elements, widening the defini-
tion of the intergovernmental setting to include strategic tax 
determination requires a more dynamic model, and potentially 
broadens the application of FPS.
The underlying premise of this analysis is that the fiscal 
policies of a given jurisdiction influence the behavior of the 
overlapping jurisdictions. Following the notation used by 
Brueckner (2003), let each jurisdiction i  select a level of zi , 
which in this case is a property tax rate. Government i consid-
ers z j  in this decision, which is the rate chosen by an over-
lapping government in the same physical location. The 
magnitude of z j ’s effect on the choice of zi  is the measure of 
the spillover effect of an overlapping jurisdiction’s policies 
on local government i. Other attributes of jurisdiction i  that 
affect preferences for public services are described by the 
vector Xi . Officials in jurisdiction i  seek to optimize the 
following objective function:
 V z zi j i, ; .X( )  (1)
Equation 1 is optimized by selecting a level of zi  that maxi-
mizes V() such that ∂ ∂ ≡ =V z Vi zi/ 0 . The impact of these 
factors on the optimal choice of zi  is expressed as a reaction 
function:
 z R zi j i= ( ); .X  (2)
A key feature of a reaction function is that the slope can 
be either positive or negative.2 A positive sign indicates that 
local governments follow each other’s fiscal behavior and is 
consistent with “yardstick” behavior. Observing an increase 
in z j  suggests to jurisdiction i that voters’ demand for pub-
lic services has increased and it may be an opportune time to 
increase zi . Alternatively, a negative slope is consistent 
with a tax competition scenario, where an increase in one 
Figure 1. Environmental constraints.
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jurisdiction’s rate hinders other jurisdictions’ ability to 
increase revenues. Empirical studies of horizontal interac-
tions among states (Case, Rosen, & Hines, 1993) and local 
governments (Brueckner & Saavedra, 2001) have estimated 
positive relationships, finding that geographic neighbors 
tend to move their tax rates and overall levels in the same 
direction. Vertical strategic interactions may cause the reac-
tion function to take a negative slope if governments are in 
competition for use of the same tax base.
Brueckner (2003) notes that applying a reaction function 
to a vertical interaction is empirically challenging because, 
“of the inherent asymmetry resulting from consideration of 
governments at different levels” (p. 182). The relative size of 
a state to a county or a school district and the differences in 
the types of taxes they impose and the services they provide 
make comparison difficult. Within the setting of overlapping 
local jurisdictions, however, property taxes are imposed on 
the same gross tax base and the scale of service delivery is 
much more comparable.
Econometric Model
The development of an empirical framework for estimating 
Equation 2 begins by transforming it into the following lin-
ear form:
 z z zit it jt it it i t= + + + + + +−α γ β θ ε µ τ1 X .  (3)
The i  subscript indicates the government unit of analysis, 
while the j  operator indicates the overlapping jurisdiction. 
The data are measured over t  time periods forming a panel 
data structure. The i term represents the unobserved charac-
teristics of each jurisdiction that are fixed over time. The τt  
term is a set of dummy variables for each time period that cap-
ture statewide shocks that would affect property tax policy. 
The εit  value represents the error component that is specific to 
each jurisdiction in a given time period. β  measures the effect 
of a marginal change in an overlapping jurisdiction’s use of the 
property tax, and θ  contains the coefficient estimates for 
changes in Xit . The equation is additive because all variables 
have been log-transformed.
The lag of zit  is included in the equation as an explana-
tory variable. The lagged dependent variable reflects the 
dependence of the current period’s millage rate on fiscal 
choices of the previous period. Revelli (2001) interprets 
this term as the impact of incrementalism in local govern-
ment tax policy.
Equation 3 is transformed by taking first differences. This 
transformation eliminates the fixed-effects term, i, as well 
as the constant, α . This transformation causes the lagged 
dependent variable to become correlated with the new error 
term. The resulting bias in the estimate of γ  can be corrected 
for by instrumenting for ∆zit−1 . This is performed using one-
step difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
regression as described by Arellano and Bond (1991).3
Given Equation 2, the relationship between ∆zit and ∆zjt is 
endogenous. The β  parameter, which measures the impact 
of jurisdiction j’s policies, is also estimated through the same 
GMM instrumentation process as ∆zit−1  to correct for this 
endogenity bias. This is performed by using all available lags 
of the endogenous variables in levels as instruments in first 
stage equations for each of the endogenous regressors 
(Roodman, 2007).
To assess the timing of jurisdiction i’s response to ∆zjt , 
∆z jt−1  is also included in the model. Equation 4 takes the 
following form:
 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆z z z z Xit it jt jt it it t= + + + + +− −γ β κ θ ε τ1 1 .  (4)
The sign of β  and κ  will indicate the type of strategic 
response to changes in the overlapping jurisdiction’s prop-
erty tax rate. A positive coefficient estimate is consistent 
with the “yardstick” model. A negative sign is more consis-
tent with the concept of tax competition and that use of the 
common tax base reduces overlapping jurisdiction’s ability 
to generate additional revenue from the same source.
Equation 4 will be estimated for both counties and 
school districts. The estimates of β  and κ  will be com-
pared across these two types of local governments to deter-
mine whether the strategic response is categorically 
different. General purpose governments may be more sen-
sitive to the aggregate tax burden because they hold eco-
nomic development as an explicit policy objective. Special 
purpose governments like school districts may be more nar-
rowly focused on providing their services and are less con-
cerned with the broader welfare impacts of their tax 
policies. They may also be more likely to be captured by 
interest groups focused on maximizing service levels. 
Goodman’s (2015) finding that increased local government 
fragmentation is associated with higher per capita expendi-
tures is consistent with capture theory. In the case of school 
districts, teacher’s unions’ and district officials’ desires to 
increase educational outcomes may reduce their interest in 
the fiscal externalities their policies create.
An additional term is added to Equation 4 to capture the 
influence of geographic neighbors. The average millage 
rate of neighboring jurisdictions of the same government 
type is described by ∆zkt, where k  represents the average 
of all neighboring jurisdictions. Including this term allows 
the model to control for the influence of both vertical and 
horizontal strategic interactions. The approach used to 
identify these neighbors is described in the following sec-
tion as the method takes advantage of a unique administra-
tive feature of local governments in Georgia. A lag of ∆zkt 
is also included in the model. Equation 5 describes the full 
model.
 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆
z z z z z z
X
it it jt jt kt kt
it it t
= + + + +
+ + +








The objective of this analysis is to test whether a county’s choice 
of property tax levy influences the levy selected by the overlap-
ping school district. Data for this analysis were collected from 
counties and school districts in the state of Georgia. There are 
multiple reasons why local governments in Georgia are attrac-
tive subjects for investigating the question of overlapping strate-
gic interaction. First, in this state, the fiscal policies of counties 
and school districts are made autonomously by different sets of 
local officials. County property tax rates are set by the county 
Board of Commissioners, while the County Board of Education 
sets the school district property tax rate. A third entity, the county 
Board of Tax Assessors is responsible for assessing the value of 
property for tax purposes. Some states, such as Florida, have 
mandated state requirements that counties and school districts 
coordinate the establishment of their property tax rates (Lees, 
Salvesen, & Shay, 2008). In such a setting, the underlying 
assumption that county and school district fiscal policy reflects 
behavior from separate actors is violated. Georgia has no such 
mandated coordination policy and the overlapping jurisdictions 
can therefore be viewed as distinct actors.
Second, nearly every county in Georgia also has a county-
wide school district with which it shares geographic boundar-
ies. For the majority of Georgia counties,4 the school district 
and the county share the same definition for the gross assessed 
value of the property tax base. The shared definition of gross 
tax base means that this analysis is not subject to the problem 
of asymmetrical tax instruments that challenges most vertical-
interaction models (Brueckner, 2003). One caveat, however, is 
that property taxes levied by school districts and counties are 
subject to different exemptions provided by state and local 
governments. The net assessed value for a given property will 
not be the same for the county tax versus the school tax. I have 
collected data on the net digest for both types of entities and 
am therefore able to control for these differences.
A third helpful characteristic of local governments in 
Georgia is that there are 159 counties in the state. This allows 
for a large number of vertical interactions to be observed 
without having to introduce cross-state differences in the 
legal relationship between local governments. I have col-
lected data on all of the county-school district pairs from 
1996 through 2010. Fiscal data were obtained directly from 
the Georgia Department of Education and from the Georgia 
Department of Revenue. I also obtained data from the 
Georgia Department of Community Affairs which collects 
detailed local government expenditure and revenue data on 
an annual basis. I also added to this panel data on economic 
characteristics on the county-level economies collected from 
the Bureau of Economic Affairs and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. All dollar amounts are also adjusted using the BLS 
Southern Region Consumer Price Index (1983-1984 = 100).
The primary variable of interest is the property tax rate 
established by both counties and school districts in Georgia. 
Figure 2 depicts the average millage rates for both counties 
and schools along with the average county assessed property 
value per capita. The rates and the base are depicted together 
to illustrate that, on average, the property tax rate for both 
counties and school districts have stayed relatively steady 
over the 1996 to 2010 period, while real assessed value per 
capita has grown by about 33%. The bars around each line 
depict the within-year variation using a 95% confidence 
interval. Figure 3 depicts the average property tax revenues 
per capita for counties and school districts over the same 
period. It shows the same growth trend as the tax base which 
should be expected given the relative stability of the tax rates 
over this period.
Figure 2. Property tax structure of counties and school districts in Georgia 1996-2010 average millage rates and assessed value per 
capita.
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The median home value is not readily available for all 
counties in Georgia except through the decennial Census 
Current Population Survey. In nondecennial years, the 
median home value is only estimated for a subset of Georgia 
counties. I therefore interpolate the median home value 
from the average residential parcel value. The Georgia prop-
erty tax digest separates out each class of property, meaning 
that it is possible to distinguish residential from agricultural, 
commercial, and industrial property. Total gross residential 
assessed property value is divided by the number of residen-
tial property parcels in the county to approximate the aver-
age residential parcel value. I then calculate the percent 
change in this value for each county for each year in the 
panel. I then use this rate of change to interpolate the 2000 
Census Current Population Survey (CPS) median home 
value figure for each county. The ratio of the median home 
value to the total assessed property value has been used as a 
measure of the tax price by many models of demand for 
local government spending since the seminal work by 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).
Two tests were used to measure the accuracy of this 
method of interpolating the median home value. First, the 
calculated values were compared with the available Census 
median home value estimates reported in the American 
Community Survey (ACS) for 2007-2010. The ACS values 
were only estimated for 29 counties over those years. T-tests 
were conducted to determine whether there was a significant 
difference between the interpolated value and the Census 
estimates. Running the test separately by year fails to reject 
the null that the mean difference between the values is 0 for 
3 out of the 4 years of data using a .05 alpha level. Using a 
.01 alpha level fails to reject for each of the 4 years.
As a second test, the annual percent change in the residen-
tial parcel value, the basis of the interpolation, was compared 
with the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) housing 
price index. Index values were used from the three 
Metropolitan Stastical Areas (MSA) located in Georgia: 
Athens-Clarke County, Atlanta-Sandy Springs, and Augusta-
Richmond County. The FHFA price indices were compared 
with the parcel value growth factor from the counties within 
those MSAs.5 These figures were compared graphically over 
the period ranging from 1997 to 2010. This analysis showed 
a strong similarity in the behavior of the two measures. The 
results of these two tests allow a degree of confidence in the 
use of this measure as an approximation of median home 
value. Dividing this measure of median home value by the 
net assessed property value for each jurisdiction provides the 
tax price or the cost to the median homeowner of generating 
an additional dollar of property tax revenue.
Although both counties and school districts in Georgia 
are both heavily reliant on the property tax, their depen-
dence on other sources of revenue differs. For counties, the 
Local Option Sales Tax is the next most important source of 
revenue, while school districts depend on state aid as the 
second most important revenue source. County local option 
sales tax revenue per capita is labeled as SALES, and per 
capita state aid to school districts is labeled STATE. Both 
fields are log-transformed.
Income per capita (CAPINC), population density (DEN), 
and the county employment rate (EMP) are also included in 
the analysis to control for changes in economic and environ-
mental characteristics that would affect local demand for ser-
vices. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in 
Table 1. Note that the home value incorporates Georgia’s 
Figure 3. Per capita property tax revenue for Georgia counties and school districts, 1996-2010.
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40% assessment ratio, meaning that all property values are 
assessed for tax purposes at 40% of their actual market value.
Although the focus of this analysis is on vertical interac-
tion, it may also be important to control for potential horizon-
tal interactions as well. Integrating both types of competition 
into a single model would allow for a comparison of the rela-
tive magnitude of both effects. The standard approach to mea-
sure this is to create a spatial weighting matrix that controls for 
the attributes of the neighboring jurisdictions. This analysis 
uses an alternative approach that takes advantage of a feature 
of the state of Georgia. The counties in Georgia are organized 
into 12 districts by the Georgia Association of Regional 
Commissions. The regional commissions are regional plan-
ning organizations that engage in a variety of activities that 
support cooperation among county and municipal govern-
ments. These activities include “planning, land-use develop-
ment, historic preservation, aging services, revolving loan 
funds, business retention and development, affordable hous-
ing, tourism, workforce development, coordinated transporta-
tion, geographic information systems, and disaster-mitigation 
planning” (Walker, 2014). Figure 4 provides a map of the 
commissions. Membership on the commission includes the 
chief elected county official, a mayor from within each mem-
ber county, three residents appointed by the state governor, 
and two members appointed by the lieutenant governor and 
the Speaker of the State House of Representatives, respec-
tively (Walker, 2014). These regional governments provide an 
institutional channel for benchmarking property tax rates 
among neighboring jurisdictions. The average millage rate for 
each other6 jurisdiction within a commission for each year is 
used to measure horizontal neighbors’ tax policies.
Results
Table 2 presents the results from the analysis using the log of 
the county millage rate as the dependent variable, while the 
school district results are in Table 3. Each of the columns in 
Tables 2 and 3 are organized similarly. Column 1 depicts the 
one-step difference GMM estimates. One feature of this 
method is that the number of instruments created through the 
Arrellano-Bond process is quadratic with respect to the num-
ber of time periods. The estimation in column 1 used 199 
instruments. Roodman (2007) points out that a high number 
of instruments, particularly when it exceeds the number of 
cross-sections, may overfit the endogenous variables and 
therefore fail to eliminate the bias. In addition, a high num-
ber of instruments can weaken the tests for the exogeneity of 
the instruments and cause them to take unbelievably favor-
able values. These tests, the Sargan test, the Hansen test, and 
the difference-in-Hansen tests are reported with their p val-
ues at the bottom of each column. The standard practice is to 
limit the number of instruments to assess the robustness of 
the results. Column 2 restricts the instruments by only using 
the first through the third lags of the endogenous variables 
for GMM-type instruments. This cuts the number of instru-
ments used by a little more than half. Column 3 takes an 
alternative approach to reducing the number of instruments 
by “collapsing” the instrument matrix using the procedure 
outlined by Roodman. Column 4 uses the same collapsed 
instrumentation strategy used in column 3, but also includes 
the horizontal tax parameter (∆zkt) that measures the average 
millage rate of neighboring jurisdictions within the regional 
commission.
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 depict how local 
governments’ determination of their property tax rate is 
influenced by the choices of overlapping jurisdictions that 
are also taxing the same property base. This impact can be 
expressed either as a long-run cumulative effect or as a short-
run impact at a given point in time. The individual coeffi-
cient estimates must undergo transformations to compute 
either the long- or short-run effects. Using the notation from 
Equation 4, the long-run change7 in ∆zit with respect to a 
change in ∆zjt is ( ) ( )β κ γ+ −1 . These cumulative effects are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3 below the individual coefficient 
estimates.8
Looking first at the aggregate long-run impact of the 
school rate on the county taxes, the estimates in the four col-
umns of Table 2 indicate that there is almost no lasting effect 
created by vertical tax competition. The aggregate effects 
can be interpreted as a long-run elasticity for county rate 
with respect to changes in the school rate. The first three col-
umns consistently show that the cumulative effect is not sig-
nificantly significant. Column 4, which adds the horizontal 
tax competition parameter to the model does reveal a posi-
tive and significant effect that is marginally significant. With 
a point estimate of 0.933, the cumulative impact of changes 
to the school’s levy on the county levy is approximately uni-
tary elastic. This mixed set of results suggests that the cumu-
lative effect of school district tax policy on county tax rates 
is either close to zero or a positive effect. There is no indica-
tion of a negative effect that would be consistent with the 
common-pool resource problem predicted by Berry (2008). 
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
M SD Minimum Maximum
Population 52,670.84 108,203.4 1,698 92,6197
Median home value 22,791.16 10,598.76 6,886.88 69,068.92
Income per capita 13,249.92 2,658.44 7,590.77 31,320.01
School levy per capita 184.75 80.41 46.61 569.96
County levy per capita 128.26 53.8 12.02 453.21
Residential share of gross base 44.15 16.2 5.4 90.86
Employment per capita 0.44 0.13 0.13 1.13
County sales tax per capita 90.11 45.99 1 530.73
State school aid per capita 360.57 84.74 1.83 705.48
County nonsalary benefits per 
capita
31.91 17.12 1.2 165.83
Percent of county spending on 
nonsalary benefits
12.29 4.88 0.6 56.34
County general obligation bond 
debt per capita
37.03 86.74 0 737.95
Farm percent of wages 2.07 5.33 0 62.37
Service sector percent of wages 42.23 14 0 82.73
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Instead, the evidence suggest that there is either no long-run 
impact of school tax increases on county taxes, or there is a 
positive effect in which increases to the school rate signal to 
the county to also increase their tax rates.
Table 3 shows that the estimates using the school district 
rates as the dependent variable. In all four models, the school 
rates exhibit no cumulative response to changes in the county 
tax rate. The point estimates of the aggregate effect range 
between −0.023 and 0.137 and none come close to statistical 
significance.
Although neither the counties nor the schools show a last-
ing aggregate effect from the fiscal policies of their overlap-
ping counterparts, the short-run effects do show that both 
types of government make a temporary response to the tax 
policies of the overlapping jurisdiction. Using the column 3 
results from Table 2, the coefficient on the School Rate vari-
able is estimated to be 1.275. This can be interpreted as the 
short-run impact of the school rate on the county rate at time 
t. This suggests that there is a strong simultaneous mimick-
ing effect exhibited by the county governments to changes in 
the school district rate. One period later, the impact of that 
initial change in the school rate is expressed in the notation 
of Equation 4 as ( κ γβ+ ). From the estimates of column 3, 
this calculates as (−0.968 + [0.737 × 1.275]) = −0.028. The 
following period the size of the effect shrinks dramatically 
and reverses its sign.
The short-run responses between the overlapping districts 
can be depicted visually. Figure 5 plots the short-run effects 
given a change in the overlapping jurisdiction’s rate using 
the column 3 estimates. The horizontal axis represents the 
time periods following a percentage change in ∆zjt. The 
height of each line is the percent change made in ∆zit in 
response in year t. The height of the line at the y axis is the 
simultaneous response, while the height at year 1 along the x 
axis is the secondary response in the following year. The 
cumulative effect reported in Tables 2 and 3 is the sum of the 
height of the line for all time periods. This graphic reveals 
that for both counties and school districts there is a strong 
simultaneous effect so that when one jurisdiction raises its 
rate the overlapping jurisdiction responds by also raising its 
Figure 4. Georgia Association Commissions.
Source. Georgia Association of Regional Commissions.
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rate. One period after the change is made, however, the 
response is reversed. Sensitivity testing was conducted with 
multiple additional lags and the results were unchanged.
The key difference between counties and the school dis-
tricts is that the schools appear to be much less sensitive to the 
fiscal policies of the counties than the counties are to the 
school districts. This finding makes practical sense as the 
schools are special purpose governments that are primarily 
focused on providing educational services. The county general 
purpose government would be expected to take a broader view 
of the economic condition of their jurisdiction as economic 
development and regional planning are functions of county 
government in Georgia. The distinction between general and 
special purpose governments affects the short-run sensitivity 
to overlapping jurisdictions’ fiscal policies.
One caveat to the short-run difference between counties 
and schools is that their relative millage rates could explain 
up to half of the effect. School district millage rates average 
about 45% higher than the county rates. Since the coefficient 
estimates are structured as elasticities, the county percent 
changes would be larger than the school percent changes. As 
a robustness check, the models were reestimated using the 
raw millage rates instead of the logged millage rates. This 
change did reduce the size of the coefficients by about 40%, 
as expected. The direction and the size of the short-run 
responses were unchanged. Using the raw millage rates did, 
Table 2. Dependent Variable: Log of County Millage Rate.
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
County A-B full Limited instruments Collapsed instruments With horizontal measure
County rate (t − 1) 0.506*** 0.575*** 0.737*** 0.718***
(0.086) (0.092) (0.083) (0.073)
School rate 0.236 0.404** 1.275*** 0.878***
(0.145) (0.189) (0.351) (0.272)
School rate (t − 1) –0.198* –0.283 –0.968*** –0.615***
(0.120) (0.182) (0.268) (0.214)
Regional average rate 0.488*
 (0.257)
Regional average rate (t − 1) –0.234
 (0.336)
Tax price 0.061 –0.025 –0.066 –0.048
(0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.044)
ln(income per capita) 0.064 0.098 0.139 0.101
(0.134) (0.145) (0.158) (0.155)
ln(sales tax rev per capita) 0.018* 0.019* 0.018 0.014
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Pop density 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.034* 0.028
(0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
Cumulative effect of school rate 0.066 0.285 1.169 0.933
(0.209) (0.269) (0.775) (0.514)*
Number of id 157 157 157 157
N 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.617 0.654 0.604 0.680
SARGAN 366.4 223.7 27.99 43.99
SARGAN-P   0   0 0.216 0.117
HANSEN 134.1 76.48 25.31 39.44
HANSEN-p 0.995 0.251 0.334 0.240
difhansen 132 46.15 5.395 17.52
difhansenP 0.960 0.702 0.494 0.419
diff 2.151 30.34 19.92 21.91
diffp   1 0.0240 0.278 0.188
No. of Inst 199  89  43  56
Note. Estimates obtained using One-Step Difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Regression. All variables are first differences.
All tax rates and the tax prices are log-transformed. Dependent variable is the log of the county property tax rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered by county). Year dummies are included in all models. AR1 and AR2 indicate Autogression tests of the first and second order, respectively.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Figure 5. Short-run responses to changes in overlapping jurisdiction’s property tax rate.
Note. The calculations for the short-run effects are calculated as follows.
T = 0: β .
T = 1:( κ γβ+ ).
T = 2:( κ + γβ ) γ .
T = 3:( κ γβ+ ) γ
2
.
Table 3. Dependent Variable: Log of School District Millage Rate.
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
County A-B full Limited instruments Collapsed instruments With horizontal measure
School rate (t − 1) 0.728*** (0.037) 0.714*** (0.045) 0.763*** (0.058) 0.731*** (0.053)
County rate 0.041 (0.033) 0.070 (0.048) 0.237** (0.108) 0.192** (0.092)
County rate (t − 1) –0.047* (0.028) –0.074* (0.042) –0.204** (0.081) –0.165** (0.071)
Regional school average rate –0.073 (0.181)
Regional school average rate (t − 1) 0.104 (0.211)
Tax price 0.010 (0.033) 0.024 (0.031) 0.031 (0.029) 0.026 (0.029)
ln(income per capita) –0.091 (0.077) –0.104 (0.087) –0.108 (0.090) –0.099 (0.091)
ln(state aid to school districts per capita) –0.002 (0.004) –0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004)
Pop density –0.007 (0.006) –0.006 (0.006) –0.003 (0.008) –0.004 (0.007)
Cumulative effect of the county rate –0.023 (0.083) –0.015 (0.093) 0.137 (0.198) 0.101 (0.149)
Number of id 157 157 157 157
N 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848
AR1   0   0   0   0
AR2 0.188 0.166 0.224 0.195
SARGAN 175.7 116.9 20.05  35
SARGAN-P 0.555 0.000 0.639 0.420
HANSEN 134.5 76.72 28.35 45.56
HANSEN-p 0.995 0.245 0.203 0.0890
difhansen 143.2 57.61 4.354 21.54
difhansenP 0.853 0.275 0.629 0.203
diff –8.706 19.11  24 24.02
diffp   1 0.322 0.120 0.119
No. of Inst 199  89  43  56
Note. All variables are first differences. All tax rates and the tax price are log-transformed. Dependent variable is the log of the school property tax rate. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by county). Year dummies are included in all models. AR1 and AR2 indicate Autogression tests of the 
first and second order, respectively.*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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however, increase the statistical significance of the positive 
long-run responses by counties to changes in the schools tax 
rates. The long-run school responses to the counties were 
unaffected, having no long-run effect.
Taken together, the aggregate and short-term effects sug-
gest that the strategic interaction between counties and 
school districts is primarily an immediate mimicking effect 
that is largely reversed in the subsequent period. The effect 
of the school rate changes on the county rates may have a 
persistent upward effect, but it is not a strong relationship.
The impact of the neighboring jurisdictions within the 
regional commissions also had a minimal effect on the 
dependent variables. Column 4 of Table 2 shows an elasticity 
of 0.488 between the neighboring county rates and ∆zit, 
though the estimate was only marginally significant. In com-
parison, the effect of the school districts on the counties was 
nearly twice as large and the statistical significance of the 
estimate was an order of magnitude higher. The school dis-
tricts were even less influenced by the neighboring school 
districts within the commission areas than the counties were 
by their neighbors.
None of the other control variables had a consistent statis-
tically significant impact across the specifications.
Discussion
This article presented an empirical analysis of the influence 
overlapping local jurisdictions have on each other’s tax poli-
cies. The analysis focused on answering three questions. The 
first goal was to determine whether there was any interaction 
effect and, if there was any, what direction it takes. This anal-
ysis produced mixed results as to the size and significance of 
any long-run cumulative effect. The evidence suggests that 
there is minimal persistent impact from overlapping jurisdic-
tions, and if there is any effect, it appears to be positive. This 
result rejects the notion of a strong tax competition effect 
where one jurisdiction increasing its rate would cause reduc-
tions in the overlapping jurisdictions’ rates. This finding of 
minimal long-run impact is consistent with Revelli’s (2001) 
analysis of vertical property tax competition in the United 
Kingdom. The primary dynamic appears to be a temporary 
mimicking effect that is largely reversed one period after the 
property tax rate is changed.
This analysis also addresses the secondary goal of deter-
mining how the strategic response plays out over time. The 
short-run interaction between counties and school districts in 
Georgia appears to occur almost entirely within the year fol-
lowing the rate change. Additional testing was conducted with 
deeper lags with no change to the results. This analysis builds 
on Revelli’s (2001) excellent analysis of property tax rates in 
the United Kingdom by differentiating between the short-run 
and cumulative effects of overlapping jurisdictions.
The third contribution of this study is to highlight the dif-
ferential responses made by counties and school districts. 
Even though the direction of the effect was the same for both 
types of local government, the schools appeared to be much 
less sensitive to overlapping competition than the counties did. 
This finding fits with Berry’s (2008) common-pool frame-
work for vertical interaction in which special function govern-
ments are primarily concerned with providing services which 
benefit their interest group constituency. The school’s focus is 
on providing educational services and are less concerned with 
the fiscal policies of the counties on the overall tax base. In 
addition, because the effect of the interaction for both counties 
and school districts is temporary, there does not appear to be a 
significant welfare problem created by strategic interaction 
between overlapping jurisdictions. A statistically significant 
aggregate effect in either direction would have suggested that 
tax competition drives taxes and the corresponding level of 
public services above or below its equilibrium level. Instead, 
the observed data suggest that after an initial adjustment both 
types of jurisdictions return to their original state.
This analysis points toward several additional research 
questions. First, this analysis focused on the property tax 
used to finance operating expenditures. The use of property 
taxes to finance debt may not follow the same pattern of 
behavior as the decision to issue debt is more visible and may 
generate greater political costs. Second, the finding that the 
counties and the school districts exhibited different degrees 
of sensitivity to their overlapping neighbor’s tax policy begs 
the question as to how the other types of local jurisdictions 
respond. Developing an understanding of how other types of 
special purpose governments respond to the local fiscal envi-
ronment remains an important research goal.
One next step would be to integrate municipalities into 
this research. Doing so would significantly complicate the 
research design, however, because it would lose the perfect 
boundary overlap between school districts and counties that 
aided this analysis. Developing a framework to address the 
asymmetrical relationships between a broader mix of over-
lapping local jurisdictions will significantly deepen our 
understanding of the local fiscal environment.
This analysis also demonstrated a broader context for the 
FPS framework as an application of Ostrom’s IAD Framework 
to local government budgetary decisions. Using this lens to 
study the impact of institutional forces on fiscal administration 
may be a useful approach for future research. Framing the 
annual budgetary process as an “action space” within the IAD 
framework and then examining the patterns of fiscal behavior 
that arise in response to the institutional setting may be a help-
ful tool for understanding the administrative challenges that 
emerge in an environment of overlapping jurisdictions.
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Notes
1. The word neighbor does not necessarily mean geographic 
neighbor. Horizontal effects among states that are economically 
similar, but do not share a border are often examined in empiri-
cal studies. See, for example, Case, Rosen, and Hines. (1993).
2. Taking the derivative of Equation 2 with respect to z j  yields 
−V Vz z z zi j i i/ . As Vz zi j  can take either sign, so can 
Rzi .
3. Roodman (2007) provides an excellent description of how dif-
ference and system GMM estimators are both derived math-
ematically and implemented using Stata.
4. There are an additional 18 independent school districts that 
align with certain cities and towns that have opted out of the 
county-school districts. For the sake of simplicity, I exclude 
these independent school districts from the analysis to focus 
on the interaction between the county and the primary county-
wide district.
5. Clarke County was compared with the Athens-Clarke MSA, 
DeKalb, Fulton, and Cobb counties were compared with the 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs MSA and Richmond County was com-
pared with the Augusta-Richmond MSA.
6. This is constructed by taking the sum of millage rates for all 
jurisdictions for a given year. The rate for jurisdiction i is then 
subtracted from this sum. The remainder is then divided by the 
number of remaining jurisdictions.
7. See De Boef and Keele (2008) for a derivation and applica-
tion of long-run effects from a dynamic model. β  and κ  are 
the estimates of the vertical neighbor’s rate at t = 0 and t = −1, 
respectively, while γ  is the coefficient from the lagged depen-
dent variable.
8. The value is computed as a nonlinear combination of the coef-
ficient estimates using the nlcom function in STATA. Standard 
errors of the cumulative effect are also reported in the table.
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